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National Labor Strategies in Changing 
Environments: 
Perspectives from Mexico* 
Maria Lorena Cook 
Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University 
Introduction 
Trade unions throughout the world are facing important 
challenges as a result of the global trends toward trade 
liberalization and the internationalization of national economies. 
Heightened global competition has both undermined national labor 
movements' ability to negotiate with their governments a range of 
economic and social policy issues and reorganized the workplace, 
introducing new forms of work organization, new technology, and 
demands for new skills. The relatively recent movement toward 
regional economic integration represented by the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Union, and 
MERCOSUR has accelerated many of these trends. 
Yet, while national labor movements throughout these 
regions are facing similar economic pressures, they bring to this 
common set of challenges different historical experiences, different 
organizational structures and institutional arrangements, and 
different sets of political relationships. To what extent do these 
This is a slightly revised version of a paper prepared for the Conference on 
"Labor, Free Trade, and Economic Integration in the Americas: National 
Labor Union Responses to a Transnational World," Duke University, August 
25-27,1994. 
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differences affect national labor movements' capacities for 
response to the challenges posed by regional economic integration 
and free trade? This question is significant not only because of 
the watershed that economic globalization represents for labor 
movements in a variety of political, economic, and institutional 
settings, but because it also asks whether more "successful" labor 
strategies for confronting economic integration and liberalization 
may be reproduced across national boundaries, and whether 
coordination of strategies across national borders is possible. 
This essay will look at the evolution of Mexican trade 
unions' strategies in response to changes in their political-
economic environment over a period of nearly twenty-five years. 
The purpose of the essay is to determine which factors proved 
most important in shaping trade union responses to environmental 
changes over time, and to note how the recent economic opening 
and regional integration represented by NAFTA have thus far 
affected and are likely to affect in the future labor unions' capacity 
to respond to such challenges. The Mexican case is of special 
importance in the Latin American context due to the 
implementation of NAFTA, the rapid and extensive recent opening 
of the Mexican economy, and the likelihood that Mexico's 
relationship with the U.S. will sharpen the effects of free trade for 
Mexico relative to other countries in the hemisphere that engage in 
regional free trade agreements. For these reasons, what happens to 
Mexican trade unions under NAFTA will be closely watched by 
labor movements in the rest of the hemisphere. 
This essay will disaggregate trade union strategies in 
Mexico in the recognition that multiple strategic currents have 
emerged over time and have often conflicted and competed with 
each other. Understanding what gives rise to these different 
currents, and why they succeed or fail under different economic 
and political environments, helps us to understand better both how 
strategic options emerge and what determines trade unions' 
capacity to choose among these options. These issues in turn can 
give us a better sense of what strategic choices trade unions may 
have available to them in a global environment which is largely 
recognized as hostile to labor unions. 
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Determinants of Trade Union Strategies: Environment, 
Organizational Structure, and Politics 
In this section I identify three clusters of factors that are 
likely to influence the kinds of strategies trade unions may adopt. 
The first is the political-economic environment, which refers to a 
set of background or contextual variables in response to which 
labor unions react. The second refers to a set of 
organizational/structural factors, which typically determine the 
range of strategic options available to labor unions. The third, 
political factors, also affect unions' range of options, but at the 
same time, politics tends to be more contingent and therefore 
permits a greater degree of voluntarism to enter into the 
determination of trade* union strategies than that suggested by the 
first and second categories. These clusters and the relationship 
among them are described in more detail below. 
1) Context: The Political-Economic Environment 
This set of factors refers to the political and economic 
background or context in which trade unions operate. Included in 
this category are the broad economic trends affecting a national 
environment and such factors as political regime and the range of 
state policies that affect labor. Thus, an authoritarian political 
regime may affect the development of trade union strategies 
differently than a democratic regime; an economic development 
model based on import-substitution, as opposed to one based on 
exports, is likely to present a different set of challenges and 
establish different parameters for trade union actions. For 
instance, a statist economy is likely to reinforce a "political" 
strategy among trade unions: that is, one that targets the state and 
attempts to shape national economic and social policy through the 
acquisition of political bargaining leverage and legislative 
influence. This is an environment and a strategy often associated 
with a national labor movement with a high degree of 
centralization: the presence of relatively strong national unions 
and peak confederal organizations. The contemporary trends 
toward internationalization and privatization of the economy, on 
the other hand, tend to undermine the traditional strategies of 
national labor organizations (Golden and Pontussen 1992). For 
political regimes that have relied on a corporatist social pact with 
labor, this crisis of national unions or peak confederal 
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organizations may also point to a deeper crisis of the regimes 
themselves. 
The relationship between political-economic environment 
and labor strategies is an interactive one: through its actions labor 
can also shape the political and economic environment. The extent 
to which labor can successfully do so, however, depends on its 
bargaining power and degree of autonomy, and therefore on a 
combination of the other factors listed below. 
One of the working assumptions in this discussion is that as 
national economies become more open, their economic 
environments tend to converge. Thus, recent trends toward 
globalization tend to generate similar pressures on national labor 
movements in different countries, whereas nationalistic economies 
experienced more distinctive sets of challenges that were strongly 
influenced by domestic political relations and institutions. 
2) Organization and Structure 
This cluster refers to two sets of factors: 1) the 
organizational structure of trade unions, and 2) their sectoral 
location. Organizational structure refers to a) the degree of 
centralization of a labor movement; b) the degree of fragmentation 
or concentration; and c) the intraorganizational dynamics of the 
unions; i.e., their degree of internal democracy or oligarchy. 
In a comparative review of unions in advanced 
industrialized countries (Golden and Pontussen 1992), 
organizational variables appeared to offer an important explanation 
for differences in trade unions' strategic options and preferences, 
given similar economic pressures within and across countries. 
Especially important was consideration of the degree (and nature) 
of fragmentation or concentration and the degree of centralization 
of the labor movement. Organizational structure determines the 
range of strategic options available to unions and their capacity to 
choose among these options in order to respond to changes in the 
political economy. In this way, a high degree of centralization and 
concentration of the labor movement—that is, the presence of 
relatively strong national unions and peak confederal 
organizations—reinforces the pursuit of a strategy of "political 
exchange," the pursuit of political power via legislative means. 
This is so because such organizations are better equipped to deliver 
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wage restraint to political elites, a necessary element of the 
political bargain between labor and the state. 
Trade unions in a fragmented labor movement, on the other 
hand, are more apt to exercise marketplace power through 
collective bargaining than political power through legislative 
means (Pontusson 1992:12). This is so because, in a fragmented 
labor movement, unions are not "encompassing" organizations and 
cannot as readily bargain with the state on behalf of a large 
constituency. A labor movement that exhibits a high degree of 
fragmentation, moreover, may be more given to competition 
among unions, which in turn tends to devolve political power to 
those union officials who are closer to the rank-and-file (Pontusson 
1992:18). A higher degree of internal democracy would also tend 
to reinforce the bargaining strength of those unions that privilege a 
marketplace strategy. 
One issue to examine is the extent to which economic 
developments such as privatization and trade liberalization affect 
union organizational structure. The effects of economic change on 
trade union structure may be especially significant to the extent 
that they generate greater fragmentation in the labor movement, 
which may in turn further undermine the strategies of national 
unions or confederations. At the same time, trade liberalization 
and regional economic integration may expand the range of 
strategic options by facilitating the adoption of "transnational" 
labor strategies for some unions. 
Finally, sectoral location is also an important determinant 
of trade union strategy because it helps to define: a) bargaining 
strength and b) the target of union strategies (the state or private 
employer). Whether unions are located in private or nationalized 
industry, in the public sector, in services, in so-called "sunset" 
industries or in those likely to expand—all of these factors will 
shape the range of strategic options available to unions and the 
effectiveness of the choices they make. 
3) Political Factors 
The third cluster includes political factors. These include 
a) the influence of political parties and political currents; b) the 
unions' relationship with the state; and c) the ideology and actions 
of union leaders. Unions' ties to political parties are likely to 
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shape the kinds of strategies they pursue, especially if the link is 
with a party in power, or if the party is a key member of the 
political opposition. Similarly, the existence of political currents 
within trade unions can also affect trade union strategic capacity by 
generating internal competition, creating factionalism, and/or 
weakening unions' bargaining power. Second, unions' 
relationship with the state is an important determinant of trade 
union strategic options and choices. Here the key issue is the 
degree to which unions are autonomous from the state. This in 
turn may depend on some of the other variables we have 
mentioned: sectoral location, organizational structure, and 
political party identification. Autonomy from the state may also 
change over time, not only in relation to who is in power, but in 
relation to the extent to which the state actively intervenes in the 
labor arena. A final important factor in shaping strategic options 
and choices is what the union leadership believes and does. A 
union leadership that is strongly committed to supporting a 
particular government for political or ideological reasons is 
unlikely to undertake actions that would jeopardize this 
relationship, regardless of how effective a more militant strategy 
might be. Likewise, a leadership strongly committed to socialism 
in a capitalist economy would likely pursue strategies that may not 
be advisable on purely economic or organizational grounds. 
Whereas many of the factors listed above primarily affect 
the range of strategic options unions may draw upon, some of the 
political variables will tend to affect the choices they make. For 
instance, while economic trends may undermine a particular union 
strategy, and structural factors may weaken a union's bargaining 
power, political factors—ideology, party identification, opposition 
to the regime, etc.—may prove more powerful in determining the 
kind of strategic choices unions make. In other words, a 
distinction should be drawn between options and choices. 
Moreover, choice is inherently risky; not all choices will be the 
most effective. Ideology, for instance, may lead to a particular 
strategy choice that is very ineffective or costly, given other 
structural and environmental considerations. 
The rest of this essay will examine the role these factors 
play in the determination of trade union strategies in Mexico from 
1970-1994. First, however, the next section will describe the 
organizational/structural and political characteristics of the 
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Mexican labor movement during the period known as "stabilizing 
development" in Mexico, in the two decades prior to the period I 
examine. 
Changing Environments and Trade Union Strategies in Mexico 
Stabilizing Development in Mexico: 1950-1970 
The period known as that of "stabilizing development" in 
Mexico refers to the approximately two postwar decades in which 
Mexico experienced relatively high rates of economic growth, low 
inflation, industrial expansion, and urbanization. For labor unions, 
this was a period of unusual stability when compared with the 
generally conflictive thirties and forties, the decades during which 
national labor confederations were shaped, the Left was driven out 
of the major national industrial unions, and unions' ties to the PRI 
were forged.1 The Mexican labor movement exhibited a high 
degree of centralization: the Confederation of Mexican Workers 
(CTM) was by far the largest and most important peak confederal 
organization. It enjoyed a close relationship with the PRI, 
comprising one of its three sectoral organizations (labor, peasant, 
and "popular" sectors). By the mid-1950s, most national industrial 
unions in key sectors (oil, railroads, mining, electricity) were also 
affiliated with the PRI. In the 1970s, eighty-five percent of the 
country's unionized population belonged to the Labor Congress, an 
umbrella labor organization formed in 1966 consisting of thirty-
three confederations, federations, and national unions; all but three 
member unions belonged to the PRI (Zazueta and de la Pena 
1984).2 Although there had been important dissident movements 
within labor, especially in the late 1940s and again in the late 
1950s, these movements had been defeated in favor of an "official" 
labor sector with close ties to the ruling party. 
For a thorough analysis of the relations between the labor movement and the 
state in the decades following the Mexican Revolution, see the study by 
Middlebrook, forthcoming. 
These were the telephone workers' union after 1976 (STRM), the electrical 
workers in the SME, and the nuclear industry workers in the SUTIN. 
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The hegemony of "official" labor organizations in this 
period, and particularly of the CTM, was aided by regular wage 
increases, steady improvements in benefits to organized workers, 
and direct subsidies from the state to official labor organizations. 
In addition, national industrial unions, the CTM, and other, smaller 
confederations associated with the party typically held positions in 
the National Executive Council of the PRI and became party 
senators and representatives in the federal and state legislatures. 
These national labor organizations pursued a "political" strategy 
during this period: they hoped to guard and to strengthen future 
bargaining power through the acquisition of political influence in 
government offices, in the party, and in congress. In exchange, 
national labor organizations and peak confederal organizations 
ensured wage restraint, political control, and political support for 
the President's actions and for the ruling party. In addition, 
organized labor saw itself as a partner of the regime in joint pursuit 
of revolutionary-nationalist objectives: the nationalization of key 
industries, extensive state involvement in the economy, a "welfare" 
state that took care of the poor and intervened in their behalf, a 
state in which the "popular" classes participated as coalition 
partners in defense of the regime against the private sector, foreign 
imperialists, the conservative Right and the radical Left. This 
ideology of revolutionary-nationalism involved a collection of 
beliefs, loyalties, and goals that defined the actions of much of the 
labor movement for many years. 
The organizational centralization of the labor movement, its 
political strategy, and its identification with the regime were 
possible in large part because of the economic development path 
that Mexico pursued in this period. The policies associated with 
import-substitution industrialization (ISI), begun in the 1930s but 
pursued with greater rigor in the 1940s under Presidents Manuel 
Avila Camacho and Miguel Aleman, supported an alliance 
between organized labor and the state. ISI involved the expansion 
of domestic industry and greater state involvement in the economy, 
as well as significant benefits to the working class in terms of 
wages, benefits, and political influence, at least in its early phase. 
The alliance between labor and the state was further strengthened 
in the Mexican case in the wake of the 1910-17 Mexican 
Revolution. The struggle for power among competing factions that 
followed these turbulent years led the government to search out 
labor as an ally, first with President Calles and the CROM and 
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later with President Cardenas and the CTM. Thus, both political 
and economic developments in mid-century favored the national 
political strategy that organized labor pursued in Mexico. It was 
not until the 1970s that both the economic model and the 
hegemony of official labor organizations, together with their 
political strategy, would face strong challenges. 
Labor Insurgency: 1970-19763 
The first half of this decade marked an important period of 
change for labor organizations in Mexico. The early 1970s also 
witnessed the first signs of crisis of Mexico's "stabilizing 
development" model. A recession in 1971 and again in 1973-74, 
during which inflation increased beyond its 1960s levels, were 
followed in 1976 by the first peso devaluation in twenty years. 
Rapid industrialization and urbanization between 1950 and 1970 
had generated a new labor force, and the diversification of 
industrial production produced changes within factories that 
would form the basis for worker protests over the labor process 
(San Juan 1983:5)4 
The early seventies was also period of democratic political 
opening, primarily in response to the political crisis of legitimacy 
brought on by the government's massacre of students at Tlatelolco 
in 1968. This political opening was reflected in the relatively 
greater tolerance for unarmed dissident and democratic movements 
in a number of areas, including labor. In this period, the 
administration of Luis Echevema Alvarez (1970-76) granted 
official registry to new, independent unions, many of which had 
broken away from "official" labor confederations. The 
government also frequently took the side of workers in forcing 
employers to comply with the requirements of the new federal 
labor law.5 The government's tolerance of independent labor 
3
 Parts of the following two sections are drawn from Cook 1990a and 1991. 
4
 See Basurto 1983, Bizberg 1983, Camacho 1984, Saldfvar 1982, and Trejo 
Delarbre 1984 for general accounts of independent and democratic 
movements in this period. 
5
 Registry was granted relatively freely to new unions by the Labor Ministry 
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movements reflected in part an effort to break the hold on power of 
some entrenched sectors of the labor bureaucracy, which were seen 
as obstacles to needed economic and political reform. 
The political space created by Echeverria's democratic 
opening was a major factor in the expansion of labor insurgency 
between 1971-1974 (Camacho 1984:62-63).6 Other factors 
included the increased influence in the labor sector of political 
currents of the Left, many of which emerged soon after the 1968 
student movement and included student activists and organizers 
who moved into factories, poor urban neighborhoods, and the 
countryside. These political activists fed upon the discontent that 
existed among rank-and-file workers with the lack of democracy 
within most unions and with the political control in favor of the 
ruling party exerted by "official" labor confederations. Thus, 
many of the movements in this early period of labor insurgency 
were not only struggles over wages and working conditions but 
over union democracy and autonomy from official labor 
organizations, the state, and the ruling party. 
Movements for union democracy and autonomy from 
official confederations occurred in several important industries. In 
autos, for example, the restructuring of the industry in the late 
1960s led to changes in work organization which sparked worker 
struggles over control of the labor process, wages, and 
representation (Middlebrook 1989). Several auto unions that had 
belonged to the CTM broke away in this period to join an 
independent labor federation, the Independent Workers' Unit 
until 1974 . Moreover, in an effort to undermine the power of the CTM, many 
registries were granted to the CROC in this period. The new Federal Labor 
Law went into effect on May 1 1970, and expanded rights and benefits to 
unorganized workers. This law spurred workers in small and medium-sized 
industries to force their employers to meet the requirements of the law (see 
San Juan 1983; Basurto 1983:48). 
A statement made by Echeverria during a congress of the Federation of Federal 
District Employees (CTM) was widely interpreted as both a sign that the 
regime would limit state intervention in the case of opposition movements 
within unions, and as a warning to official leaders: "How are we going to 
speak of democracy if in Mexico when union leaders are selected the process 
is not democratic?" (Camacho 1984:63). 
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(UOI). Other breakaways from parent unions or confederations 
occurred in mining, steel, textiles, and transportation, and in small 
to medium-sized firms among bakers, garment workers, textile 
workers, and furniture manufacturers (San Juan 1983). Locals of 
national unions in the parastatal and public sectors also erupted 
into conflict over the democratization of their unions: this was the 
case with the Union Movement of Railroad Workers (MSF), led by 
1950s railroad strike leader Demetrio Vallejo, and with the 
telephone workers, postal workers, employees of the Federal 
District's treasury department, and workers in health and 
education. Unionization drives also took place among 
administrative and technical workers of the Mexican oil company 
(PEMEX), who tried to organize outside of the official oil workers' 
union; among clerical and manual workers at public universities, 
and later, among professors and bank workers. Between 1971 and 
1976, one of Mexico's most important democratic union 
movements—the Democratic Tendenc emerged from a conflict 
over the merger of the electrical workers' unions. 
The Emergence of New Strategies 
While the so-called "labor insurgency" spanned a range of 
industries and sectors, as noted above, two key and distinct 
"strategic currents" worth discussing emerged in this period. They 
differed from each other with respect to overall goals, tactics, 
political alliances, and to some degree, sectoral location. These 
currents are described more fully below. 
a) Autonomy and Economism in "Modern" Industry. One 
of the most imponant trade union strategic currents to emerge in 
this period was distinguishable from other sectors of the labor 
movement, primarily the "official" corporatist sector, by its 
position of autonomy with respect to political parties and the state. 
Labor groups that followed this "autonomist" strategy rejected the 
political party linkages of the traditional corporatist sectors of 
labor, as well as organic links with all political parties. These 
groups further rejected a political role for labor, arguing that trade 
unions should restrict themselves to improving the wages and 
working conditions of workers. However, upholding an 
"apolitical" role for labor did not prevent the unions that pursued 
this strategy from engaging in movements to democratize their 
unions, in the belief that union democratization and/or 
independence from official labor organizations would enable 
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workers to follow a more militant strategy in pursuit of wage 
increases and improvements in working conditions.7 This was the 
case with many of the automobile unions in the early 1970s, 
sections of the miners and metalworkers union, and the telephone 
workers' union after 1976. The labor organization that best 
expressed this strategy was the Independent Labor Unit (UOI), an 
independent confederation formed in 1972 that organized unions 
in the auto, pharmaceutical, textile, rubber, and transportation 
industries during the early 1970s. 
Labor organizations that followed this strategy were 
located in several different industries, but concentrated mostly in 
the more advanced industrial sectors, such as autos, steel, and 
telecommunications.8 The ownership of the companies and 
industries where these insurgent movements occurred and the 
organizational structure of the unions also varied considerably. 
The auto industry was dominated by foreign companies, such as 
Chrysler, General Motors, Ford, and Nissan. Mining, steel, and 
metalworking was a mixture of private and state ownership, and 
telecommunications, at least in TELMEX, was a parastatal. Auto 
unions were organized on a plant-by-plant basis and each union 
held title to its collective bargaining agreement. One union, the 
Telephone Workers' Union (STRM), organized workers at 
TELMEX. One large national union also existed in the mining, 
steel, and metalworking sector. In this sector, each local had its 
own contract but the national committee of the union was the legal 
agent. As a result, locals of this union were less free to disaffiliate, 
and the democratic locals continued to operate within the 
framework of a national union whose leadership was often hostile 
(Bizberg 1983). Nonetheless, there was limited bargaining 
autonomy for union locals, enabling some of the most combative 
ones to secure better conditions than their counterparts in the 
union. 
Of the nine auto plants studied by Roxborough (1984), five of these were 
organized by militant and democratic unions. Of these five, two were 
organized by the CTM. 
Enrique de la Garza has referred to these as the "stabilizing development" 
workers. See E. de la Garza Toledo 1991. 
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In spite of these dissident movements' "apolitical" stance, 
political groups were active in organizing the movements in 
several of these sectors. In the mining and metalworking union 
and the telephone workers' union, members of a Maoist political 
organization, Linea Proletaria, played an important role. Indeed, 
in 1978 members of this organization felt strong enough to make a 
bid for the national leadership of the miners' union (it failed) 
(Roxborough and Bizberg 1983:124-29). As with the UOI, this 
political organization opposed union participation in the PRI or in 
opposition political parties. Linea Proletaria was successful at 
organizing among workers for better working conditions; it was 
particularly effective at selecting and cultivating "organic" leaders 
from among the rank-and-file. Linea Proletaria's pragmatic 
strategies were well suited to the "particularistic and economistic 
orientations" of rank-and-file workers (Bizberg 1983). Linea 
Proletaria was also influential in the telephone workers' union 
after a successful dissident rank-and-file bid for the leadership in 
1976. 
b) Democratic Revolutionary-Nationalism. Revolutionary-
nationalism was one of the most important ideological and 
strategic currents in the history of Mexican trade unionism. The 
origins of this current are linked to the beginnings of Mexico's 
national industrial unions and major confederations and the 
nationalization of strategic industries during the 1930s under 
President Lazaro Cardenas. Lombardo Toledano, one of the 
founders of the CTM, was the historical figure who best 
represented this tendency. In the thirties and early forties, 
Lombardo Toledano supported the idea of a unified labor 
movement that would ally with the nationalist elements in the state 
to free Mexico from imperialist domination. This vision coincided 
at different times with the Communist Party's popular front 
strategy of alliances in the thirties as well as with the more pro-
government stance of a sector of the CTM leadership. Thus, some 
important "official" labor organizations (such as the CTM) as well 
as more militant and independent unions fell into this same general 
strategic category. 
In the 1970s, unions and political tendencies that fell into 
this category shared a sense that the Mexican state (or certain 
sectors of it) were protectors of the ideals of the Mexican 
Revolution: strong state intervention in the economy, 
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nationalization of important industries, and strong protections for 
labor and the popular classes. Thus, labor and some political 
parties could strengthen the state's commitment to the nationalist 
project by allying with and exerting influence upon the nationalist 
elements in the state. The key difference between "radical" and 
traditional corporatist currents of this strategy was that the 
corporatist tendency still saw the PRI as the most important ally in 
the nationalist project. The "radical" tendency, on the other hand, 
tended to see the corporatists as too complacent, and felt that a 
strong revolutionary-nationalist pole had to be constructed outside 
of the PRI, incorporating opposition political parties and 
independent unions as well as nationalist currents within PRI 
unions. 
The revolutionary-nationalist current was strongest among 
unions in the older, state-owned industries such as railroads, 
mining, electrical power generation, and oil. The radical version 
of this current could be found in some sector of the railroad 
workers' union, among electrical workers and later the nuclear 
power industry, and in the universities (de la Garza 1991). Again, 
the organizational structure of unions involved in this current 
varied considerably. Most of the classic revolutionary-nationalist 
current could be found in the large national industrial unions 
founded in the 1930s and 1940s. The more radical or democratic 
version tended to be concentrated in locals of some of these 
national unions (railroads), or in smaller unions among electrical 
workers (SUTERM, SME), and nuclear power (SUTIN), as well as 
in the university unions that were being formed during the 1970s. 
Most of these latter movements also shared a political connection 
with the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) or one of the Left 
organizations that joined with the PCM to form the PSUM in 
1981.9 
The radical revolutionary-nationalist current represented 
the most important sector of the independent labor movement in 
the early-to-mid seventies. In turn, one of the most important 
movements within this current was the Democratic Tendency. The 
Democratic Tendency originated with a conflict over the merger of 
two electrical industry unions, one democratic (the STERM) and 
9
 On the origins of the PSUM, see Carr 1987. 
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the other non-democratic (the SNESCRM). The electrical workers 
of the democratic STERM, headed by Rafael Galvan, organized 
national meetings in solidarity with the independent labor 
movement and managed to attract the support of students, other 
workers, and popular organizations. In 1975 the leaders of the 
democratic current were expelled from the new union that was the 
product of the merger (the SUTERM), unleashing another series of 
demonstrations. 
The Democratic Tendency was behind several important 
initiatives in this period to develop a national alternative to official 
unionism. In 1975 it issued the "Declaration of Guadalajara", a 
program of the independent labor movement that called for 
democratic unions, the nationalization of strategic industries, 
greater state intervention in the economy, along with an increased 
role for workers in the state economy, and the creation of large 
single industry unions (de la Garza 1991). In 1976 several dozen 
organizations formed the National Front for Popular Action 
(FNAP) in support of the Democratic Tendency and adopted many 
of the principles set forth in the Guadalajara declaration. The 
Democratic Tendency and the FNAP managed to stage some of the 
largest demonstrations of the decade. But the FNAP did not 
succeed in gaining extensive labor support, nor even the support of 
the autonomist current, which represented the other strong pole 
within the independent labor movement. As a result, the FNAP 
quickly became ineffective, and faced with government repression, 
the Democratic Tendency fell apart in 1977. Repression was also a 
factor in the disappearance of some of the other movements 
supportive of this tendency, including the democratic movement of 
railroad workers and, in 1983, the SUTIN. 
National Labor Response to Union Fragmentation 
The labor insurgency of the early 1970s represented a 
direct threat to the monopoly of peak labor organizations, 
particularly the CTM. Although numerically small, the emergence 
of independent unions and the insurgency of labor organizations in 
this period was politically significant.10 The fact that the 
government encouraged the formation of independent unions and 
Approximately 5% of the labor force made up this independent current 
(Basurto 1983:29). 
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dissident movements threatened the strategy of political exchange 
that national labor organizations-the traditional allies of the 
regime—engaged in with the state. Many independent unions had 
made greater economic gains during this period, leading several 
unions to disaffiliate from the less aggressive CTM and Labor 
Congress (Basurto 1983:94). Clearly unable to control rank-and-
file workers within its member unions, the CTM's bargaining 
strength was undermined. 
The CTM responded by radicalizing its demands—taking up 
some of the demands of the independent movement—and by 
threatening to mobilize its forces in order to pressure the govern-
ment to respond (Bizberg 1983:336; Trejo Delarbre 1984:71). In 
1973 the CTM and the CT raised the demands for an emergency 
wage increase and for the 40-hour week (with 56-hour pay) in an 
effort to regain legitimacy among rank and file workers and to 
preempt the independent labor movement (Basurto 1983:74-90; 
San Juan 1984:112.). These demands were accompanied by an 
increase in the number of strike petitions on behalf of the CT, 
accounting in part for the increase in the frequency and volume of 
strikes with respect to the previous administration, despite the fact 
that real minimum wages and benefits generally increased between 
1968 and 1975.11 
The Echeverria administration had been playing off inde-
pendent labor organizations against official unions, but it soon 
turned to the official labor sector in order to reinforce political 
legitimacy and to counterbalance the private sector.12 By the end 
of Echeverria's term, the official sector was again being recognized 
as the main interlocutor for labor, mending the rift in the labor-
state alliance. This was evidenced in the government's adoption of 
its wage claims and the creation, peaking in 1974, of a number of 
11
 Basurto 1983:77, 79; Casar and Marquez 1983:250; Zapata 1986:111. For a 
study of wages throughout the period and a description of the changes within 
the Federal Labor Law affecting the minimum wage, see Casar and Marquez 
1983. 
12 
This alliance would be strained, however, at various points during the 
remainder of the Echeverria administration and beyond. See Alvarez 
1987:23; Basurto 1983:89; Camacho 1984:70; San Juan 1984:113. 
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federal labor welfare agencies, many of which were to be 
controlled by the official labor sector.13 Government support was 
transferred from independent unions back to official labor 
organizations, and the government stopped granting registries to 
independent unions after 1974.14 Selective repression of 
independent and democratic labor movements also began, and the 
CTM was given free rein in its campaign against the electrical 
workers' Democratic Tendency.15 Thus, raced with pressure from 
economic elites over the government's radical populism and its 
economic policies, the administration turned again to one of its key 
coalition partners, the organized labor movement, for political 
support. This change in attitude toward the official labor 
movement further bolstered this sector's reliance on a strategy of 
political bargaining. 
The Legislative Strategy and the Broadening of Alliances: 1976-
1982 
The administration of President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-
1982) reversed the earlier economic policy of internal market 
expansion, and began to hold wages down as an inflation-fighting 
measure; real wages began their downward trend in this year 
(Casar 1982:35; Casar and Marquez 1983:252 ). The government 
was forced to rely on the official labor sector to contain wage 
Basurto 1983:36-45; Casar and Marquez 1983:251. These included the 
National Tripartite Commission, created in May 1971; the National Wage 
Protection Mixed Committee, in April 1974; the Fund for the Guarantee and 
Promotion of Worker Consumption in May 1974; the National Labor 
Housing Fund Institute, the National Council to Promote Worker Culture and 
Recreation, the Editorial Popular de los Trabajadores, a publishing house; the 
Federal Law Office in Defense of Labor, and the Labor Bank, as well as a 
1975 consumer protection law and labor-favoring modifications of the articles 
regulating profit-sharing in the Federal Labor Law. 
Except to the UOI, whose leader was personally close to the Labor Secretary 
(San Juan 1983). 
Alvarez 1987:26; Trejo Delarbre 1984:69. For information on the Democratic 
Tendency see, among others, Cuellar Vazquez 1986, Gomez Tagle 1976 and 
1980, and Trejo Delarbre 1978. 
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demands. In 1977 the first of several wage ceilings was 
implemented under the "Alliance for Production," an agreement 
between the peak labor associations, the government, and the 
private sector to control prices and wages (Trejo Delarbre 
1984:73.). In exchange, the government marginalized those 
independent unions that tried to break the wage ceilings during a 
1977 strike wave, and intervened in labor conflicts against 
independent unions and opposition currents within unions.16 In the 
early 1970s, increased militancy among independent unions had 
led directly to wage increases that in some cases (automobiles and 
rubber) were higher than the national average.1 Under Lopez 
Portillo's application of wage ceilings, however, the efforts of 
many of the more independent unions to gain more for their 
workers were blocked despite militancy in some sectors (especially 
electricity, telephones, auto and steel) during this period (Bizberg 
1984:174-77, 183-84).18 In contrast, "official" unions in private 
firms were able to move successfully against the wage ceilings in 
1979 and 1980 (Bizberg 1984:184). 
With the improvement of the economy in 1978 and the dis-
covery of additional oil reserves, the official labor sector began to 
act more aggressively, seeking new strategies that would help it 
regain its bargaining power. Official labor did not initially resort 
to strike threats (until 1979-80), but rather sought out new arenas 
Some sectors of labor were able to break through these ceilings. This was the 
case with the UOI-with unions in transnational companies. Electrical and 
petroleum workers were able to secure increased benefits rather than wage 
increases in their collective agreements during this period (San Juan 
1984:117-18). See Bizberg 1984:172-79, for wage increases and responses to 
the wage ceilings in four different sectors: government employees, national 
industrial unions (parastatal firms), large national confederations (national 
private firms), and foreign private firms (UOI). 
At the height of the Democratic Tendency, electrical workers also obtained a 
69% wage increase (Bizberg 1984:178). 
Whereas some UOI unions had been able to break through wage ceilings 
under Lopez Portillo, the real wages of workers in these unions (automobiles) 
fell at a faster rate than those of other industrial unions after 1977 (Bizberg 
1984:179). 
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within institutional channels-the Labor Congress (CT) and the 
Chamber of Deputies in the legislature—to press its demands (San 
Juan 1984:115-16). Partly in response to the threat to official labor 
organizations posed by the legal registration of opposition political 
parties under the 1977 electoral reform and to the state's austerity 
policies, official and independent unions alike sought more flexible 
alliance strategies. For instance, the CT and CTM reiterated the 
need to include independent unions in the umbrella organization. 
For their part, independent unions also demonstrated a greater 
willingness to join the CT after 1977 (Bizberg 1984:186-87).20 
In 1978 the Labor Congress held its first national assembly 
since its founding in 1966, with the participation of several 
independent and democratic unions.21 At the CT assembly, the 
labor organizations, led by the CTM, developed economic 
proposals that called for reorienting production, improving the 
marketing and supply of basic foodstuffs, and nationalizing the 
banking, food, and pharmaceutical sectors (CTM 1978; Trejo 
Delarbre 1984:72). The proposals also called for state 
development of the "social sector"—an economic category con-
sisting of state-owned and labor controlled industries that produced 
basic consumer items (San Juan 1984:115-16). In these documents 
and in the "Manifesto to the Nation," elaborated by PRI labor 
deputies in 1979, the official sector took up many of the principles 
The Labor Congress was an umbrella labor organization formed in 1966, 
consisting of some thirty-three unions, confederations, and federations. 
In 1979, several unions and federations joined the CT for the first time: the 
Union of Nuclear Industry Workers (SUTIN), the Federation of State 
Government, Municipal, and Decentralized Federal Office Workers; the 
Confederation of Workers and Peasants; the National Union of Social Security 
Workers; and the national union of INFONAVIT. The CT also supported the 
inclusion of the nuclear energy, bank, and university workers' unions in 
section A of the Federal Labor Law, a designation that would give these 
workers the right to strike, among other things. In 1978-79 the CT supported 
the telephone workers' union, the university unions, and the UOI in their labor 
conflicts. 
Among the independent unions that attended the meeting were the university 
unions, the nuclear energy workers' union, and the bank workers. 
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and policy suggestions set out in the Democratic Tendency 
platform.22 
In addition to the strategy of broader alliances and greater 
unity within the CT, the official labor sector lobbied for increased 
influence in the government via an increase in the number of 
political appointments within the administration and the party (San 
Juan 1984:116). The official labor sector had strongly opposed a 
1977 electoral reform that increased the presence of opposition 
political parties in the lower house of the legislature because it 
threatened to reduce the proportion of seats occupied by the PRI's 
labor bloc (Middlebrook 1986). However, labor succeeded in 
increasing the number of seats normally allotted to it within the 
Chamber of Deputies.23 Many of the proposals by the labor bloc 
overlapped with those presented by opposition representatives of 
the Left coalition during the 1979-83 legislative session in the 
Chamber of Deputies, the first in which the Left political 
opposition could participate after the electoral reform.24 
Nonetheless, labor deputies preferred to abstain or walkout during 
voting on labor issues presented by the opposition rather than vote 
For a study of the legislation proposed by the labor bloc in congress, and more 
on the "Manifesto," see Casar 1982. Also see the document itself: CTM et al. 
1979; parts are reprinted in Excelsior, Oct. 30, 1979. The manifesto issued 
demands for deep structural reforms of the economy, a radicalization of the 
agrarian reform, and a strengthening of the worker-peasant alliance with the 
state, as well as a series of constitutional reforms affecting labor. 
On the 1977 political reform, see Middlebrook 1986. The proportion of seats 
in the federal Chamber of Deputies held by the labor sector during the 1979-
1982 legislative session increased over that of the previous session. In 1976-
79, labor deputies held 15.6% of the seats in the Chamber; in 1979-82, their 
share jumped to 29.3%. The proportion of labor deputies in the Chamber 
surpassed one-third only in the 1967-^0 session (31.4%). Since then it 
declined steadily until 1979, the first legislature affected by the 1977 political 
reform (Reyna 1979:397, Zazueta and de la Pena 1984:274). 
Many of the Left Coalition's initiatives, however, were merely sent to the 
"congeladora" (freezer): the congressional committees dominated by the PRI, 
in which opposition initiatives were blocked or "frozen." (Author's interviews 
with opposition deputies in the 1979-82 and 1982-85 legislatures during July-
August 1983). 
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against their party or present labor legislation in the congress. In 
spite of the PRI labor bloc's refusal to admit common ground with 
opposition parties, official and independent unions within the 
Labor Congress shared the belief that a united labor movement 
could influence and redirect national economic and social policy. 
The Emergence of New Groups 
Toward the end of the 1970s, opposition movements 
emerged both within and outside of labor. Because of the new 
space opened by the political reform, political parties channeled 
their resources toward electoral participation, and municipal 
elections became a focus of opposition organizing. Independent 
campesino and urban neighborhood organizations expanded, 
forming national networks (Prieto 1986). Budget cutbacks in the 
public sector and industrial restructuring raised new issues around 
which workers organized.26 Labor organizers moved into new 
areas-the organization of non-unionized wage earners and the 
democratization of official organizations, especially in the public 
sector (Ravelo Blancas 1983; San Juan 1984:118-20). 
Dissident movements within the public sector faced 
tremendous odds. Legal restrictions on strikes, centrally-
determined working conditions, and the fact that the government 
was also the employer converged to restrict expressions of dissent. 
Dissident groups could not form new unions, as in the private 
sector, because Mexican authorities only recognized one union per 
government agency. Thus, dissident groups frequently worked to 
25
 Casar 1982; San Juan 1984:116; Trejo Delarbre 1984:72. Casar mentions that 
there was much similarity between the proposals of the leftist coalition in 
congress, and those included in the labor bloc's manifesto. However, 
agreement on issues did not lead automatically to votes for the socialists' 
proposals, as labor deputies preferred to abstain or walkout during voting on 
labor issues presented by the opposition (my interviews in July/August 1983 
with opposition deputies in the 1979-1982 and 1982-1985 legislatures). 
Workers in industry and in some parts of the service sector (i.e., 
communications) faced new problems related to the labor process, work 
conditions, and employment. Similarly, in public administration, 
decentralization and the reclassification of workers threatened to reduce 
benefits, undermine seniority, and increase work loads and unemployment. 
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democratize their local union governments, hoping in this way to 
"conquer" the national leadership of the union from within. 
Most public sector unions belonged to the Federation of 
Unions of State Employees (FSTSE), linked in turn to the National 
Confederation of Popular Organizations (CNOP) of the PRI. 
Through these organizations public sector unions played an 
important role in the political system via their support of the party 
and of government policies. This was especially true of the 
national teachers' union, whose membership comprised over half 
of the FSTSE, and whose logistical support during elections was 
perhaps greater than that of any other union. Consequently, 
dissident movements within this sector threatened political stability 
and challenged government austerity policies in a period of 
economic crisis. 
One of the largest and most important insurgent movements 
in the public sector was represented by the National Coordinating 
Committee of Workers in Education (CNTE), an organization of 
dissident members and democratic locals within Latin America's 
largest union, the National Union of Workers in Education (the 
teachers' union). Teachers' union dissidents formed the CNTE in 
1979 to push for improvements in working and economic 
conditions and for the democratization of the union, which 
belonged to the PRI and had close ties to the government. The 
CNTE managed to mobilize broad sectors of the union and it also 
spearheaded several working-class and popular initiatives against 
austerity and repression in the early 1980s. 
The CNTE reflected another version of the "autonomist" 
strategy mentioned above, in that it also sought autonomy from 
political parties and the state, even though a number of political 
party organizations and currents operated within the movement. In 
addition, the CNTE's political strategy envisioned a broader 
national project and saw other labor and popular allies as important 
in bringing about political and economic change. It held national 
political democracy and union democracy to be linked, and saw 
these as important goals for labor unions and popular organizations 
to pursue. Unlike the revolutionary-nationalist current, proponents 
of this strategy tended to reject alliances with sectors of the state, 
seeing the state as the primary enemy of the working class. 
Although the CNTE survived as a force within the union 
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throughout the decade, its influence was largely restricted to the 
few locals it had managed to control. In 1989, however, the CNTE 
formed part of a massive rank-and-file mobilization for higher 
wages and union democracy, which ended successfully in the 
removal of the union boss who had been in power for seventeen 
years (Cook 1990b; forthcoming). 
In sum, official union strategies after 1970 could be 
understood largely in terms of union efforts to preserve their 
privileged status with the state vis-a-vis other organizations. 
Strikes were threatened, but rarely carried out, not during periods 
of economic recession but mostly in response to the competition 
introduced by the formation of new organizations within and 
outside of existing unions, and that competed with official labor in 
representing workers and in obtaining recognition from the state. 
The official unions' moderation of their wage claims, their efforts 
to suggest alternative policy directions, their constant lobbying for 
a greater number of positions in congress, the party, and 
government, and their focus on electoral participation and support, 
represented efforts to secure long-term over short-term interests; in 
particular, to maintain or expand their political power for future 
bargaining. 
The 1980s: Economic Crisis and the Narrowing of Strategic 
Options 
The early 1980s marked the beginning of a severe 
economic crisis in Mexico that would last the remainder of the 
decade. The oil boom came to an end with a major recession in 
1980-1981 (Alvarez 1987:54). In 1982 average annual inflation 
jumped to 58.9% from 27.9% the previous year, which was 
unusually high by Mexican standards of the time; the peso was 
devalued in February and August, and economic growth was neg-
ative.27 President Lopez Portillo responded to a flurry of capital 
flight with the nationalization of the banks in September 1982. 
This dramatic and controversial move was supported by much of 
the opposition on the left, but especially by the popular sectors of 
the party, of which labor was the most important. The 
Figures for inflation were taken from Casar and Marquez 1983:232. In 1983 
inflation jumped to 104% (Bizberg 1984:168). 
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government's relationship with the private sector, however, was 
eroded to a point that rivaled that of Echevenia's six years earlier. 
The administration of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) 
was characterized by more public confrontation between the 
official labor sector and the regime.28 The incoming President's 
primary concern was to address the economic crisis and to repair 
relations with the private sector. Among de la Madrid's first 
actions was to devise an economic program, the Immediate 
Program for Economic Reordering (PIRE), which called for, 
among other things, wage controls and the reduction or elimination 
of public consumption subsidies (Middlebrook 1989:293).29 The 
CT responded to the program with its own set of proposals 
emphasizing defense of the worker as consumer rather than as 
producer, in an effort to increase or at least to preserve the worker's 
"indirect wage" (Zazueta and de la Pena 1983:118-19).30 Another 
labor-employer pact was signed at the end of December, at the 
initiative of labor, in which the parties pledged to control prices 
and limit wage demands. However, the pact was broken soon after 
when the government authorized price increases in January 1983 
(Zazueta and de la Pena 1985:61). 
The hostile relations between the government and the CTM 
in particular helped to increase tensions within the CT. Other labor 
organizations long dissatisfied with the CTM's dominance of the 
CT began to seek out alliances with "friendly" factions within the 
de la Madrid government (Zazueta and de la Pena 1985:61). 
Likewise, sectors within government fostered divisions within the 
CT by playing off the major national confederations against each 
other (Alvarez 1987:122). The deliberate attempt to create 
divisions within the official labor movement by shifting subsidies 
and recognition to rivals of the CTM was evident in a number of 
Disagreement over the selection of Lopez Portillo's successor was evident 
from the beginning as shown in the CTM's declaration that it was giving the 
new President "conditional support" (Zazueta and de la Pena 1983:115). 
For details of the PIRE, see Zazueta and de la Pena 1985:57. 
The details of the CT proposals can be found in "Congreso del Trabajo, 
Solidaridad para el cambio" in lino mas uno, December 15, 1982, p. 28. 
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government actions, including Labor Secretary Arsenio Farell's 
statement that the rival CROC would become the "vanguard" of 
the labor sector, substantial government financial support to a 
CROC cooperatives project in 1984, and the implicit government 
approval of a breakaway of unions from the CTM to join the 
CROC in late 1983 (Zazueta and de la Peha 1985:63).31 
* 
The anti-labor tone of the de la Madrid administration, the 
government's rapprochement with the private sector at the expense 
of organized labor, and its efforts to play favorites with the labor 
confederations were persistent themes of the de la Madrid 
government that became evident within the first six months. At the 
same time, the severity of the economic crisis, as well as the 
private sector's violation of the pacts, generated strong pressure for 
the labor organizations to demand wage increases. The CTM was 
forced to take action under these circumstances, in part to test its 
relationship with the new government. In April 1983 the 
government authorized a new set of price increases for basic 
consumer products (Zazueta and de la Pena 1985:62). The labor 
sector, led by the CTM, threatened to strike if contractual wage in-
creases were not granted. Many of the unions within the CT, 
including the independent unions, joined the CTM strike call. The 
result in June 1983 was one of the largest strike waves in recent 
years, even though many CTM unions settled before striking.32 
Increases of between 15 and 20% were granted in many cases, but 
the independent unions that had struck were hit hard—the 
university unions were forced to lift their strike and return to work 
without compensation, and the nuclear energy workers (SUTIN) 
were left jobless when the parastatal company closed in response 
to the union's efforts to return to work after the strike. The 
31
 The CROC cooperative project was funded by the Labor Ministry with 300 
million pesos and included a projected employment of 4 million workers 
(Garavito Elias 1984:10). 
32
 See Rendon Corona 1984. Between 1,000 and 5,000 CTM unions went on 
strike, as well as the SUTIN, university unions, telephone and electrical 
workers, and the CNTE. Other important confederations and unions within 
the CT, such as the CROC, CROM, CRT, SNTE, and the President of the CT, 
rejected the strike action. 
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government had delivered a clear message that labor militance and 
unity would not be tolerated under the new administration. 
After the summer 1983 strike wave, organized labor-both 
independent and official—went on the defensive. The CTM in 
particular moved away from the aggressive defense of the direct 
wage toward the defense of jobs and the indirect wage (Garavito 
Elias 1984:8-10).33 To this end, the official labor sector began to 
push harder for the development of the social sector.34 In response, 
Article 25 of the Constitution was reformed to include mention of 
the social sector, and the administration included the social sector 
in its new economic program, the National Program of Industrial 
Promotion and Foreign Trade (PRONAFICE) in July 1984. 
Another component of the official labor strategy was to try to 
cushion the impact of the economic crisis on workers through 
protective clauses in collective labor agreements, focusing 
primarily on the provision of a "basic needs package" within the 
agreements.35 
The decline of government-labor relations led again to a 
relative openness on the part of the CT toward independent unions, 
in the interest of developing greater bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
state (Zazueta and de la Pefia 1985:61). The CT supported several 
of the more progressive unions within the organization during their 
respective conflicts—the Union of Nuclear Industry Workers 
(SUTIN), the Mexican Electrical Workers' Union (SME), and the 
33
 Also see interviews with Whaley and Gershenson of the SUTIN, and with 
Domfnguez of the FAT, in Concheiro and Rhi Sausi 1984:59. 
34 
In July and August 1984, two major meetings were held on the social sector. 
A 21-point document presented by the CT to the Ministry of Labor in June 
1984 emphasized a greater state role in the economy, price controls on basic 
consumer goods, and expansion of the social sector. The union organizations 
also channeled funds from the Labor Bank for the acquisition of consumer 
goods, to be distributed and sold at lower prices, and for the acquisition of 
"social" oriented businesses: refreshments, textiles, foodstuffs, and 
construction. 
35 
See Zazueta and de la Pena 1985:63 for government programs aimed at 
addressing these concerns presented by the official labor sector. 
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Union of Telephone Workers' of the Mexican Republic (STRM), 
whose installations were occupied by the government in a 1984 
strike. A 1984 Labor Movement Forum in Defense of Collective 
Agreements and Unions -organized by the SME included 
democratic unions that did not belong to the CT as well as national 
industrial unions. Within the CT, the SUTIN, SME, STRM, and 
the airline pilots' union, ASPA, formed a progressive column that 
pushed for new strategies in opposing the crippling effects of gov-
ernment economic and wage policy (Concheiro and Rhi Sausi 
1984:64). 
Organizations inside and out of the CT formed broad 
"fronts" in order to increase solidarity across sectors in 
demonstrations and meetings against austerity and against what 
they perceived as government attacks on unions and popular 
organizations. Among these fronts were the Pact of Union Unity 
and Solidarity (PAUSS), the National Front in Defense of the 
Wage and Against Austerity and the High Cost-of-Living 
(FNDSCAC), the National Coordinator of Unions (COSINA), and 
the National Worker Peasant Popular Assembly (ANOCP). These 
organizations were initially active in demonstrations and marches 
but soon weakened, due in part to the conflicting pressures of 
pursuing particular organizational needs and a joint strategy at the 
same time. 
The CTM also became more active in debates within the 
party, reacting to what it saw as a declining emphasis on the role of 
the popular sectors in the PRI. The labor organization argued in 
favor of strengthening the role of the sectors (labor, peasant, and 
popular) within the party. This debate came in the midst of 
pressures to reorganize the party to expand its appeal to individuals 
outside the sectors, in preparation for the July 1985 legislative 
elections. Among the demands of the CTM were that party 
candidates demonstrate a history of militancy and involvement in 
the sectors of the party, a response to the increasingly 
"technocratic" composition of party candidates, as well as to the 
declining support for the PRI at elections (Zazueta and de la Pefia 
1985:65-66)^ 
See also CTM, Comision Dictaminadora, "La CTM y el PRI," April 15, 1984. 
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By 1985 the effects of the government's modernization 
policies were being felt in several areas of labor. Conflicts over 
the content of collective agreements became widespread in the 
auto, communications, and electrical industries (industries that had 
been directly affected by restructuring), the most notable case 
being that of the SME.37 Unions in these sectors fought company 
efforts to remove hard-won clauses in collective agreements, while 
the companies introduced technological changes to increase 
productivity at less cost.38 Unions that reacted with strikes often 
emerged from these far weaker than when they started. The strike 
began to emerge as a costly and ineffective response; more often 
than not its use facilitated employers' restructuring plans. Many 
parastatal companies were sold, leading to layoffs and the 
disappearance of union locals that had once been important centers 
of union independence and democracy. The government's 
reorganization of public administration also led to layoffs in July 
1985, and to some resistance on the part of dissident sectors within 
unions, though from a very weak position. At the same time, 
conflict over decentralization and the imposition of the civil 
service career-track increased discontent within the public sector. 
Despite isolated attempts to resist these policies, their net effect 
was the immobilization of organized labor. 
Under the de la Madrid administration, the official labor 
sector's moderation of its claims no longer guaranteed its former 
levels of political power. Labor's bargaining power had reached an 
all-time low. This marked a crisis in the traditional mechanisms 
used by the official labor sector in its negotiations with the state. 
The dramatic wage erosion suffered by labor under de la Madrid 
weakened the control exercised within unions over members, since 
union leaders were no longer able to "deliver the goods." 
The SME had long been engaged in a battle to preserve the union under 
threats to liquidate the Compania de Luz y Fuerza del Centro and force the 
SME to join with the SUTERM, effectively forcing the SME to lose its 
collective agreement, among the oldest and most favorable to the workers. On 
the SME see El Cotidiano No. 22,1988. 
Those sectors where changes in the labor process were most comprehensive 
included automobiles and telecommunications, two sectors that contained 
relatively independent and militant unions. 
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However, the debilitating effects of the economic crisis on both 
official and independent sectors of labor also altered expectations 
of what it was possible to achieve during this period, limiting 
traditional expressions of labor militancy and complicating 
dissident groups' efforts to protest. 
Among those sectors hardest hit by the industrial 
restructuring and economic crisis of the 1980s were the 
"independent" and democratic unions and locals that had been at 
the forefront of the democratic insurgency of the 1970s. By the 
end of the 1970s the automobile industry had shifted its production 
strategy from the domestic market to one oriented to export 
production. To this end, automobile manufacturers opened several 
new facilities in northern and central Mexico in the 1980s. 
Workers at these new plants were organized into unions affiliated 
with the CTM. The new collective contracts were very favorable 
to management. Wages at the new plants were also lower. New 
technologies and new forms of work organization that were being 
resisted by experienced workers at the older auto plants were 
introduced in these new plants, where the workforce was younger 
and less experienced. * 
Manufacturers also sought to reverse the trend of union 
control over key aspects of the production process in the older 
plants. Important contract provisions were modified at the Dina-
Renault plant in the mid-1980s (it was later closed) and at the Ford 
Cuautitlan plant in 1987, both democratic unions. Two other Ford 
plants were closed in 1983 and 1985, and the Cuautitlan plant was 
briefly closed in 1987 during a strike for wage increases and then 
reopened with 2500 rehired workers and new terms favorable to 
management (Middlebrook 1991, 1989:86, 92; Gutierrez Garza 
1989:80-81; Garza and Mendez 1987: 385). A strike at the Nissan 
Cuernavaca plant in 1988 was declared "inexistent" by labor 
authorities, a judgment that by many accounts represented a highly 
creative application of Mexican labor law. Only a strike at the 
Volkswagen plant in Puebla in 1987 was successful. 
Democratically-organized automobile unions were generally more militant 
than their non-democratic counterparts, and won greater union control over 
the production process and more favorable collective bargaining agreements. 
See Middlebrook 1989:85-86; Roxborough 1984; Middlebrook 1991. 
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Workers in the steel and mining industries were also very 
affected by industrial restructuring throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. Restructuring in the 1970s, however, often had the effect of 
spurring rank-and-file challenges against incumbent leaders. For 
example, threatened layoffs of unionized temporary workers in 
1971-72 led to a strike and democratic movement against the 
incumbent leadership in local 67 of Fundidora de Monterrey. In 
the 1980s similar restructuring pressures led to profoundly 
negative effects for unions. In 1986 approximately 14,000 workers 
at the Fundidora de Monterrey plant vigorously protested the 
proposed closure of the plant due to bankruptcy, only to lose their 
jobs (Rubio and Veloquio 1986). At Altos Hornos in Monclova, 
Coahuila, approximately 4,000 workers struck in 1989 protesting 
layoffs, substantive modifications of their collective bargaining 
agreement, and subcontracting. After two months on strike, 
however, they were forced to accept the company's initial proposal 
(Vazquez Rubio 1989). 12,900 workers at a second plant in Altos 
Hornos, local 147, also tried to resist company efforts to layoff 
4500 workers and modify the collective bargaining agreement; 
they, too, were ultimately forced to accept a revised agreement. In 
these cases strikes proved ineffective in halting restructuring plans. 
The unsuccessful strikes and labor contract modifications 
in auto and steel unions during the 1980s reflected the weakening 
of the "economicist" strategy. In the early 1970s the UOI had 
expanded its membership and successfully competed with 
organizations representing revolutionary-nationalist strategies as 
one of the most important labor strategies of the seventies. By the 
late 1970s, the UOI was on the defensive. The breakaway 
movements of the early 1970s had ended, and Lopez Portillo's 
imposition of wage ceilings made it more difficult for the UOI to 
win struggles over wages. Some of the unions within the UOI 
experienced unsuccessful strikes, and discontent with the 
organization led some key unions to disaffiliate. In addition, 
between 1981 and 1986 nearly 10,000 workers lost their jobs in the 
vehicle-manufacturing industry (Middlebrook 1991). By the mid-
1980s the UOI, which had once had as many as 150,000 members, 
had largely disappeared (see Mendez et al 1990). 
The economic crisis, the increasingly neoliberal direction 
of economic policy, and the anti-labor tone of the de la Madrid 
administration greatly reduced the bargaining power and room for 
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maneuver of all sectors of labor in the eighties. A final unified 
effort to stand up to the new administration's austerity policies fell 
apart in 1983. During the remainder of the eighties, the standard of 
living for millions of workers declined precipitously. Most labor 
organizations went on the defensive, trying merely to survive the 
wage decline, budget cuts, and massive restructuring of industry 
and public administration. Other sectors, in particular urban 
neighborhood organizations and students, took the lead in 
protesting their conditions. Eventually the deteriorating economy, 
the tragic 1985 earthquakes, continued electoral fraud, and the 
emergence of a political alternative during the 1988 elections 
threw the political system into crisis, seriously eroding the 
legitimacy of the "official" party and of the organizations that 
comprised its sectors. 
The 1990s: Economic Opening and Political Crisis 
The administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
(1988-1994) was marked by two important developments. First, 
the opening of the Mexican economy that had begun under de la 
Madrid in 1985 was accelerated. Under Salinas the change in 
Mexico's economic strategy from an inward-oriented economy to 
one oriented toward export production was consolidated, as the 
government undertook a series of important measures to facilitate 
foreign investment, liberalize trade, and reduce the state's role in 
the economy through an extensive privatization effort. Capping 
these measures was the approval of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) by the legislatures of all three North 
American governments in late 1993. In contrast to the policy 
swings that marked the Echeverria, Lopez Portillo, and even the de 
la Madrid governments, economic changes under Salinas set 
Mexico well on the path of a more neoliberal model of 
development. 
The second major development under this administration 
was the powerful political challenge posed by the center left 
opposition led by Cuauhtemoc Cardenas during the 1988 
presidential elections. The appearance of this political threat to the 
PRI shaped many of the political developments that ensued. 
President Salinas pushed for a series of important reforms of the 
PRI, many of which directly threatened the power of the organized 
labor movement, one of the party's key sectoral organizations. At 
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the same time, the administration tried to cultivate ties with 
previously independent and autonomous social organizations in an 
effort to both undercut the political base of the new opposition 
party and to create new, revitalized social bases for the regime. 
These developments in the political-economic environment 
had major implications for the labor movement. Many of the 
economic reforms that were implemented had the effect of further 
weakening the bargaining power of organized labor. Beginning in 
1987, the CTM became a signatory to a series of "pacts" involving 
government, business, and rural organizations, and which pledged 
to fight inflation through limiting wage increases. Labor was a 
reluctant partner in this pact, which effectively took the power to 
negotiate wage increases away from labor organizations and placed 
the decision making over wages in the hands of the president's 
cabinet (Dresser 1994). While the pact has been credited with the 
dramatic lowering of the inflation rate from its 1987 levels, it has 
also been responsible for the continued decline in the real 
minimum wage. 
In addition to wage controls, labor was affected by 
industrial restructuring, privatization, and layoffs which continued 
apace during these years. The increased competition that was a 
product of the opening of the economy led to the closing of a large 
number of small-to-medium sized domestic firms and in turn to a 
large number of layoffs, and high rates of unemployment and 
underemployment. Restructuring and privatization also frequently 
led to layoffs as factories, mines, and foundries eliminated workers 
in an effort to cut costs and become more efficient. 
These developments clearly undermined labor's bargaining 
power at the national level and frequently at the subnational level 
as well. As in the previous decade, strikes were often ineffective 
weapons. The government, through the tabor Ministry and the 
Labor Conciliation and Arbitration Boards, usually supported the 
employers in conflicts with labor. Workforce resistance to the 
imposition of more flexible forms of production was met in several 
high-profile instances with the closing of the plant in question, and 
the subsequent rehiring of the workforce under terms far more 
favorable to management (Middlebrook 1991, 1992; Garza and 
Mendez 1987; Nauman 1992). Tactics such as these clearly 
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undermined labor's ability to resist the introduction of more 
flexible arrangements. 
The other effect of these policies was to undermine the 
political strategy of the national labor movement. This 
undermining was further extended by the administration's efforts 
to reorganize the party in a way that gave less power to sectoral 
organizations. Instead, the arena of negotiation moved to a more 
decentralized level: limited bargaining between unions and 
employers would occur.at the level of the firm or at the site of 
production over the labor process itself, worker training, union 
participation in production decisions, etc., but only in those cases 
where the union accepted the basic outlines of labor flexibility and 
new production methods (de la Garza 1994). In those cases where 
unions attempted to resist the imposition of such measures, as 
noted above, the workers were often defeated. 
Negotiations over production issues shifted bargaining 
authority from the national labor movement to local unions. The 
administration's encouragement of this development was made 
evident in its support of a new federation of unions. This new 
organization, called the Federation of Goods and Services Unions 
(FESEBES), was formed in 1990. Composed in part of unions in 
restructured services (telephones, airlines, electricity generation), 
the FESEBES tried to increase union participation in workplace 
changes and in determining standards of productivity and quality. 
The unions in this group had traditionally been considered more 
democratic than those in the "official" sector, and they were not 
formally affiliated with any political party, although in practice 
some of these unions—in particular the SME and the telephone 
workers' union—moved closer to the PRI than had previously been 
the case. It should also be noted that most of the unions involved 
in the FESEBES were those that had constituted the "progressive 
column" within the Labor Congress in the mid-1980s. 
The CTM saw the emergence of this new federation as a 
direct threat to its hegemony over the labor movement and its 
privileged role as interlocutor with the state. The government's 
encouragement of this competition within the labor movement was 
reminiscent of similar efforts in the early 1980s, when de la 
Madrid played off the major labor confederations against each 
other. However, the FESEBES was initially more threatening 
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because its member unions espoused a new, more "depoliticized" 
and decentralized form of bargaining that appeared more consistent 
with Mexico's new economic model, whereas the CROC in 1983 
was simply a more complacent version of the CTM. 
In contrast perhaps with the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
CTM had difficulty navigating these new seas. For many 
observers the CTM and other official labor confederations were 
clearly an anachronism, a holdover from an already antiquated 
nationalist development model and an authoritarian corporatist 
political regime. Both the economic modernization and the 
democratization of the country required the disappearance of 
corporatist unions that relied primarily on political bargaining, had 
lost touch with the rank-and-file, and were better known for their 
ability to contain worker demands than to negotiate at the 
workplace. 
Nonetheless, throughout the Salinas period, but especially 
as the presidential succession neared, the CTM was able to reassert 
its role as an economically and politically important social actor. 
The support of the official labor movement became important to 
the regime in sustaining its policy of wage restraint, in backing 
President Salinas on NAFTA, and in supporting the PRI and the 
President's decision on his successor. The official labor movement 
was still capable of bargaining during this period, in spite of 
important restrictions with respect to previous years. Persistent 
lobbying by the labor movement succeeded in stalling extensive 
reorganization of the PRI and reform of the Federal Labor Law, 
two vitally important areas in which labor stood to lose a great 
deal. Meanwhile, the promise of the FESEBES appeared to fade 
toward the end of Salinas's term, as serious differences among 
member unions began to emerge and the presidential succession 
forced the government to seek a rapprochement with the CTM at 
the new federations' expense. In fact, the perception by other 
labor groups that the FESEBES lacked autonomy vis-a-vis the 
government weakened its chances of becoming an effective 
alternative interlocutor for the labor movement. 
In sum, trends in the early 1990s strongly undermined both 
"official" and "independent" labor movement strategies. The 
economic opening, privatization, and industrial restructuring 
rendered unviable the revolutionary-nationalist current of the labor 
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movement, which rested on its support for state involvement in the 
economy and the nationalization of key industries. Even Cardenas, 
who came closest to representing this current in the late 1980s, 
backed away from his earlier criticisms of Mexico's economic 
path. Privatization also affected the traditional strategies of 
national industrial unions because the locus of their negotiations 
shifted from the state to private employers. The effect was to 
decentralize and depoliticize bargaining. In those sectors where 
the state retained ownership, such as the oil industry, the once 
powerful union was "broken" early on, allowing the government to 
restructure the industry, layoff workers, and reshape the collective 
bargaining agreement with a much more complacent union 
leadership. 
The wage controls, restructuring, privatization, and high 
unemployment had the effect as well of narrowing the range of 
strategic options of trade unions. The "official" labor movement 
represented by the CTM could do little more than try to contain the 
erosion of its power base and bank on its traditional importance to 
the authoritarian regime to do so. The unions involved in the 
FESEBES tried to emerge as an option to the CTM but were 
unable to do so at a national level. Their efforts led them to a 
closer identification with the regime—particularly, with the 
President—than any of these previously "independent" and 
"militant" unions had enjoyed before. The close relationship with 
and dependence on the executive limited the kinds of strategies and 
alliances that these unions could pursue. Meanwhile, democratic 
struggles within unions, in response to workplace changes and low 
wages, were frequently unsuccessful. The labor movement was a 
particularly harsh environment for the PRD, in spite of the 
widespread support for Cardenas that had evidently come from 
rank-and-file workers in 1988. The government intervened harshly 
in the oil workers' union, whose leader had expressed sympathy 
for Cardenas in 1988, and other signs of sympathy for the left 
opposition were quickly and often violently repressed by the CTM 
and the government. In contrast with the Echeverria period, then, 
there was little regime tolerance for labor autonomy and alternative 
political positions in the labor movement. Ironically, even though 
formal ties between labor unions and the official party had been 
broken, unions were not being permitted to form alternative ties to 
other political parties. The early 1990s thus signaled a crisis of 
strategies for all sectors of the Mexican labor movement. 
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Free Trade and Economic Integration: Implications for Trade 
Union Strategies 
The processes of economic restructuring and trade 
liberalization affected the traditional arenas in which trade unions 
had carried out their strategies. The internationalization of the 
Mexican economy and the tendency toward decentralization of 
bargaining that resulted from privatization ate away at the political 
strategy of peak confederal organizations such as the CTM. The 
opening of the Mexican economy meant that the state could no 
longer command the same degree of control over domestic 
economic and social policy; the factors that affected these policies 
had shifted from the domestic arena to the international arena. 
Similarly, the shift in economic development strategy granted the 
export-oriented private sector in Mexico a greater degree of 
influence and bargaining power relative to other social actors. 
Thus, the days in which the state allied with labor to offset the 
private sector were unlikely to return anytime soon. 
Meanwhile, the privatization of large nationalized 
industries also undercut the role and influence of national unions 
and shifted the locus of their bargaining from the state to private 
employers. This decentralization of bargaining meant that 
workplace issues and nonwage bargaining would become more 
important. The emphasis on labor flexibility and improved 
productivity also meant that rank-and-file workers would be more 
immediately affected by such changes. The focus on productivity 
required a better grasp of what was happening on the shop floor, 
and in theory at least, relied on the initiative and participation of 
the workers. This kind of workplace focus was not the specialty of 
large national unions or confederations such as the CTM.40 
While the national political arena appears more undermined 
as a strategic arena for trade unions, the Mexican regime 
nonetheless continued to rely on the political support of national 
labor organizations. This reliance on its traditional ally, organized 
labor, gave the labor movement some limited bargaining power 
even though on the whole its bargaining power had been greatly 
reduced. National labor cooperation became important for 
E. de la Garza develops this argument in E. de la Garza 1994. 
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carrying out the policy of continuous wage restraint after 1987, for 
Salinas's external image in negotiating the NAFTA, and for the 
stability of the political succession in 1993-94. National labor 
organizations also remained important in controlling labor conflict 
and ensuring that the political opposition did not make inroads into 
unions where worker dissatisfaction was high. 
Thus, where long-range economic trends appeared to point 
to the erosion of a national political strategy for labor, the regime's 
continued reliance on wage restraint and political control of labor 
tended to support labor's political strategy. The concessions for 
labor support at the national level were the halting of major 
structural reform of the ruling party and reform of the Federal 
Labor Law. At the same time, the CTM regained its position as 
key interlocutor for labor with the state while the political 
importance of the FESEBES declined. These developments point 
to a contradictory relationship between national organized labor 
and the state: the relationship is undermined by some economic 
trends (privatization, internationalization, focus on productivity 
and competitiveness) but reinforced by others that remain of 
special importance to an authoritarian regime in a developing 
country (wage restraint, political control, support for the ruling 
party, etc.). 
A second strategic arena that has become more important 
with economic restructuring and trade liberalization is at the level 
of the firm or workplace. As noted above, changes in work 
reorganization, worker training, flexibility, and a new focus on 
improved productivity are the consequences of industrial 
restructuring, privatization, and the streamlining of inefficient 
plants to become more competitive in a global economy. The idea 
here is that the old methods of workplace relations exemplified by 
paternalism, rigidity, and control become obstacles to the new 
methods necessary for improved competitiveness. What is needed, 
then, are workers who participate in production decisions, who are 
trainable, and who take the initiative in resolving problems; in 
short, what is needed is a different workplace and union culture 
from that generally represented by the CTM. 
A few Mexican unions have risen to the challenge posed by 
changes in this area. Most of the unions in the FESEBES, for 
instance, had accepted more flexible workplace conditions through 
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their collective bargaining agreements, yet the unions retained an 
important role in the changes, serving on joint committees, gaining 
the right to receive information on company plans and the 
introduction of new technologies, etc. It was to encourage this line 
of union negotiation that the Salinas government supported the 
creation of the FESEBES and used it to wheedle the CTM into 
altering its practices. The unions in this strategic current are, 
theoretically, less political, more likely to use their power in the 
marketplace in order to pursue their goals through collective 
bargaining, rather than to pursue political power through 
legislative means or political bargaining with the state. At the 
same time, greater workplace participation is usually equated with 
a higher degree of democracy in the workplace and by extension, 
in the union. Therefore, unions that pursue this firm-level strategy 
successfully should be more internally democratic as well. In fact, 
those unions within the FESEBES were generally known for their 
greater degree of internal democracy than most national industrial 
unions or others affiliated with the CTM. 
Yet, in spite of the emphasis on workplace productivity, 
worker participation, and work reorganization, few worksites in 
Mexico have adopted these practices in full. The maquiladora 
industry, for example, employs production methods such as work 
teams and quality circles, yet levels of participation and real 
worker initiative are low. This is an industry that has low rates of 
unionization relative to the rest of the manufacturing sector in 
Mexico, and where efforts to organize unions are frequently 
repressed. In this sector, quality circles and work teams coexist 
with the old, paternalistic forms of labor relations and with a 
unionism that emphasizes control of workers. In those plants that 
are unionized, the unions are often involved in recruiting the 
workforce, but rarely insert themselves in bargaining for the 
workers with the employer over such things as wages, working 
conditions, or production methods. A widespread phenomenon in 
the maquila industry and among small-to-medium sized firms 
throughout the country is the "protection.contract," in which a 
contract is signed between a union and management without the 
knowledge of the workers (de la Garza 1994; Hualde 1994). This 
prevents workers from organizing a union among themselves later 
on, as only one union is recognized per plant and switching 
affiliation is politically very difficult. The likelihood, then, is that 
any kind of "new unionism" that involves bargaining over a range 
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of nonwage as well as more traditional issues, that calls for new 
forms of labor-management cooperation and of worker 
participation in production decisions, will remain relatively 
circumscribed in Mexico. 
A third strategic arena that has emerged in recent years, a 
product of the increased internationalization of the economy and 
especially, of NAFTA, is the international or "transnational" 
arena.41 This is an arena that has arisen as a result of the efforts of 
some labor unions and citizens' organizations in Canada, the 
United States, and Mexico to campaign against NAFTA. The 
attempts to mount this "trinational" campaign led to the formation 
of a number of cross-border coalitions that tried to educate and 
mobilize citizens against NAFTA and to lobby government 
officials, but especially the U.S. Congress, the site where 
NAFTA's future was to be decided. While on the whole Mexican 
trade unions supported the government's position on NAFTA, 
some groups did use this new transnational arena and their new 
allies in order to stir up the debate over NAFTA in the United 
States. This was the case in particular with the Authentic Labor 
Front (FAT), a relatively small non-governmental organization that 
had been active in organizing independent unions in the 1960s and 
1970s. In 1991 the FAT was among several other civic 
organizations in Mexico that organized the Mexican Free Trade 
Action Network (RMALC), a coalition aimed to try to raise 
criticism of NAFTA and to promote an alternative, continental 
development model. The FAT/RMALC had good relations with 
U.S. and Canadian groups, and as a result, it was able to exert a 
disproportionate influence on the free trade debate among 
grassroots organizations in the U.S. and in the U.S. Congress. On 
several occasions, it drew the attention of Mexican government 
officials involved in NAFTA negotiations, although within the 
broader Mexican society it was relatively unknown. 
Well before NAFTA, unions in Mexico and the U.S. had 
begun to seek each other out in response to the transnational 
strategies of their common multinational employers, although in a 
On cross-border coalitions and transnational labor strategies, see: Brooks 
1992; Browne, Sims and Barry 1994; Carr 1993; Cook 1994; Middlebrook 
1992; Thorup 1991,1993; Witt 1992. 
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very limited way. For instance, some auto unions had already 
begun to communicate with their other North American 
counterparts in an early effort to lend solidarity around specific 
labor conflicts. In the late 1980s, the U.S. based Farm Labor 
Organizing Committee (FLOC) sought out is counterpart in 
Sinaloa, Mexico, in order to begin coordinating in their bargaining 
with their common employer, Campbell's Soup (Nauman 1993:14; 
Moody and McGinn 1992; Browne et al 1994: 48). Cross-border 
contacts among non-labor groups began to develop in the late 
1980s around the presidential campaign of Cuauhtemoc Cardenas 
and in the immediate electoral aftermath of 1988. The debate 
surrounding NAFTA in the U.S. helped to create a broader 
awareness of the degree to which the economic futures of the two 
countries would become increasingly linked, with or without 
NAFTA. NAFTA served as a catalyst for citizen mobilization and 
organization around a process—regional economic integration— 
that had been occurring for some time. 
The increased scrutiny of Mexican domestic practices 
regarding democracy, human rights, and labor rights that the 
NAFTA debate generated may have helped increase the bargaining 
leverage of some domestic groups in Mexico. Organizations such 
as the FAT have taken full advantage of these conditions in their 
organizing efforts along Mexico's northern border with the 
assistance of the United Electrical Workers and the Teamsters in 
the United States. Other, larger labor unions have also engaged in 
cross-border contacts with their U.S. and Canadian counterparts. 
The telephone workers' union signed a cooperative agreement with 
the communications unions in the U.S. and Canada, and the 
electrical workers in the SME have also met with their counterparts 
as well as with a range of other organizations in a series of 
"trinational exchanges."42 Auto unions have participated in 
trinational conferences and have developed ties with particular 
union locals in the United States (Middlebrook 1992; Moody and 
McGinn 1992). On the whole, however, these contacts involve 
unions that disagree with respect to their position on NAFTA; with 
the exception of the FAT, most Mexican unions supported 
NAFTA, whereas their international counterparts opposed it. This 
Eisenstadt 1993; Latin American Labor News, Issue 5, 1992, p.7; SourceMex 
(University of New Mexico electronic mail news service), February 16, 1994. 
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disagreement made it difficult for U.S., Canadian, and Mexican 
unions to find common ground during the NAFTA debate. Since 
the NAFTA vote, some organizations have moved past that 
disagreement to exchange information, support, and begin to 
discuss possible common strategies. 
In spite of the passage of NAFTA and the increased 
communication between U.S. and Mexican unions, many obstacles 
remain to unions adopting a transnational strategy. These have to 
do with economic, organizational, and political factors. First, 
Mexican unions perceive NAFTA's effects differentiy than U.S. or 
Canadian unions.43 They believe, for instance, that NAFTA will 
generate a greater number of jobs for Mexican workers and that, 
over time, wages will increase. On the whole, then, they believe 
themselves to be the beneficiaries of free trade, whereas U.S. and 
Canadian workers see themselves as the losers. These differing 
views obviously make it difficult for unions to identify a common 
strategy that could benefit them all. 
Mexican unions are very limited in pursuing a transnational 
strategy in organizational/structural terms as well. Organizational 
differences between U.S. and Mexican unions make it difficult to 
locate counterparts (Middlebrook 1992). For instance, in the auto 
sector Mexican unions are organized by plant. In the United 
States, one national union, the UAW, represents most autoworkers 
throughout the country. The lack of a similar national counterpart 
complicated any efforts by the UAW to seek cooperation with 
Mexican auto unions. The ability of Mexican unions' to pursue a 
trasnsnational strategy also depends on the sector or industry 
where they are located; successful pursuit of a transnational 
strategy demands some market bargaining power within a 
particular industry as well. Thus, because of the expansion of the 
auto sector, the high levels of training and skill of its workers, and 
the presence of multinational employers, Mexican auto unions may 
have a better chance at incorporating a transnational strategy in 
their repertoire than unions in services or state-owned industries. 
Discussion of the perceptions of Mexican unions on the NAFTA issue must be 
tempered by recognition that the debate over NAFTA in Mexico was quite 
limited and largely controlled by the government. On political restrictions on 
debate of NAFTA in Mexico, see Aguilar Zinser 1993. 
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Political factors are perhaps the most important in 
determining whether and which unions may follow a transnational 
strategy. That is, the nature of labor organizations' relationship 
with the state, and their degree of political autonomy, are 
important determinants. National unions deeply committed to a 
political exchange strategy and whose bargaining power is 
generally weakened by economic and labor market trends will be 
hard put to move into the transnational arena. On the other hand, a 
transnational strategy may be pursued by unions or labor 
organizations on the other end of the spectrum: those whose 
marketplace power is quite weak, so that they risk little and in fact, 
gain greater bargaining leverage, by appealing to the support of 
international allies. The first is the case of the CTM; the latter the 
case of the FAT. For unions in the middle, such as the telephone 
workers and the SME, their ability to use the transnational arena 
may depend on a combination of their bargaining strength in the 
marketplace and the degree of political autonomy they enjoy. For 
the telephone workers' union, which was trying to establish itself 
as an alternative to the CTM and the Labor Congress, granting 
greater privilege to a transnational strategy, in a context in which 
the regime strongly opposed such efforts, would have jeopardized 
the union's principal domestic concerns. Similarly with the SME, 
whose political autonomy was curbed by its reliance on President 
Salinas for protection in a context in which the parastatal power 
company was threatened with liquidation. On the other hand, auto 
unions which, while affiliated with the CTM, nonetheless retain a 
certain degree of bargaining autonomy at the plant level may be 
politically as well as structurally better suited to incorporate a 
transnational dimension as part of their bargaining strategy with 
employers, in spite of government and CTM threats against doing 
so. Overall, however, the transnational dimension was likely to 
remain a relatively small component of trade unions' strategic 
repertoire, and one mostly located at the local level rather than in 
national unions. 
Conclusions 
For much of the 1940s through the 1970s, the key elements 
that defined the strategies of the Mexican labor movement were 
based on the economic development path of import-substitution 
industrialization, a generally strong political alliance with the state 
through the ruling Institutional .Revolutionary Party (PRI), and a 
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shared commitment of labor and political elites to the ideals of 
social justice, active state inyolvement in the economy, and 
nationalism in economic policy and politics. The tendency 
throughout much of this period was toward a greater degree of 
centralization in the labor movement, which was dominated both in 
terms of size and political influence by the CTM. The formation in 
1966 of the umbrella Labor Congress was further evidence of this 
trend. These factors combined to reinforce a labor movement 
strategy of political exchange with the state, in which peak 
confederal organizations sought to strengthen their bargaining 
power through political influence in exchange for wage restraint, 
political control of the workforce, and political support of the 
regime. 
This political strategy remained important through the 
1970s, even though it suffered one of its strongest challenges in 
that decade. In the beginning of the 1970s, the combination of 
industrial change that directly affected workplace conditions, the 
first economic recession in many years, and the political 
developments in the wake of 1968 contributed to the emergence of 
what would be called the "labor insurgency" of the early 1970s. 
These developments gave rise to two distinct currents within the 
labor movement that emerged alongside of that of the "official" 
sector represented by the CTM and Labor Congress. The first 
involved a workplace-based militancy that rejected the political 
strategy and ties to the ruling party of the "official" sector through 
democratic rank-and-file challenges to incumbent leaderships and 
breakaways from official confederations. The second current was 
a more democratic and activist version of the revolutionary-
nationalism embraced by the official labor movement. Both 
represented important challenges to the official labor movement, 
which responded by moving in the direction of its challengers: 
becoming more militant in its demands for all workers, fighting to 
expand its political influence in the party and the government, and 
trying to become more inclusive in its alliances with independent 
sectors of the labor movement. Rather than represent a departure 
from the official labor movement's traditional strategy, these 
measures could be interpreted as efforts to try to retain and 
strengthen labor's political strategy during a time of challenges 
from both the rank-and-file and from the state itself. 
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With the economic crisis of the 1980s, the political and 
economic environment became far harsher for all sectors of labor. 
Unable to deliver wage increases or other improvements to their 
membership, peak organizations like the CTM found their national 
political strategy undermined. An attempt to threaten the state 
with strike actions was thwarted by the government when it dealt 
differentially with official and independent labor groups in 1983, 
thus preempting the formation of broader alliances within the labor 
movement to protest the government's austerity policies. 
Nonetheless, the official labor sector found no successful 
alternative to its political strategy in this period, even though the 
strategy itself provided few gains for workers. However, 
independent union strategies were also in crisis. The more 
militant unions and locals in autos, steel, and mining, for instance, 
were put on the defensive as plants, mines, and foundries were 
closed, privatized, restructured and "streamlined." The crisis of 
Mexico's economic model pointed to a fundamental change in 
economic strategy, one that lessened the relevance of 
revolutionary-nationalism. In this way, some of the goals of the 
more independent and official sectors within this current that had 
been pursued in the 1970s found little resonance in government 
circles in the 1980s. In addition, the de la Madrid administration 
was far harsher on dissident labor movements and on unions 
attempting to strike. Thus, the costs of adopting militant labor 
strategies were far higher in the 1980s. The range of strategic 
options narrowed significantly in this period, driven largely by 
economic developments. 
With the opening of the Mexican economy and the 
widespread privatization of state-owned firms and industries in the 
mid-to-late 1980s and 1990s, the economic and political 
environment remained difficult for those "independent" labor 
groups that remained. With the administration of Carlos Salinas de 
Gortari there also came a more concerted effort to break the 
political benefits and influence of the "official" labor sector, thus 
weakening even further the bases of its political strategy. One of 
the consequences of the state's efforts was the increased 
organizational fragmentation of the labor movement represented 
by the creation of the FESEBES. However, whereas in the 1970s 
greater fragmentation coincided with greater militancy, autonomy, 
and internal democracy, in the 1990s fragmentation meant less 
militancy and a great strain on internal democracy in those unions 
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with this tradition. While one characteristic of this period was 
greater formal autonomy between unions and the PRI, in fact some 
key and traditionally independent unions in the FESEBES (the 
telephone workers and the SME) moved closer to the PRI. 
Overall, trade unions exhibited less autonomy with respect to the 
state, with some unions demonstrating a particularly strong 
dependence on the President. Thus, even though the FESEBES 
was supposed to represent "non-political" unions that privileged a 
strategy of negotiation with employers in the arena of production, 
its member unions still looked to the state for political recognition, 
protection, and support. 
Economic developments further eroded the political 
influence and political strategy of the national official labor 
movement. Decentralization weakened political bargaining and 
the internationalization of the economy rendered less influential 
labor's role in national policy making. At the same time, the 
government was forced to rely on labor cooperation to help 
manage the economic transition: peak labor organizations were 
key in the success of the wage restraint policy which operated 
during most of the Salinas administration, in backing the President 
on NAFTA, and in supporting the political system through the 
traditional presidential succession process, defending the regime 
against a growing number of critics, and in early 1994, against the 
threat of armed rebellion. The latter period in particular of the 
Salinas administration consisted of mixed signals to the labor 
movement: economic trends appeared to undermine the long-term 
viability of official labor's political strategy, yet the emerging 
political crisis led state elites to send encouraging signals to this 
sector. Labor leaders spotted their opportunity to regain some 
influence after the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the PRI 
presidential candidate hand-picked by Salinas, when infighting 
over Colosio's replacement became unusually open. Nonetheless, 
together with other sectors, labor again closed ranks around the 
new candidate. 
Given the uncertainty of Mexico's political future, it is 
unclear at this time what the Mexican labor movement's strategic 
options are in the short-to-medium term. On the one hand, 
economic trends would appear to render increasingly ineffective 
traditional political bargaining strategies and organizational 
centralization in favor of a more decentralized, market-based 
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bargaining strategy and greater fragmentation of the labor 
movement. On the other hand, the circumstances of Mexico's 
authoritarian regime and of its status as an economically weaker 
partner in North American regional integration tend to support the 
continuity of the labor movement's strategy of political bargaining 
at a national level, and of wage restraint and worker control at the 
level of the workplace. 
Whether one position will win out over another, or whether 
these positions will continue to co-exist uneasily, as they do now, 
will depend on three factors: 1) the kinds of industrial and sectoral 
changes that trade liberalization and further restructuring will 
produce (i.e., will the labor relations model of "unilateral 
flexibility" or "negotiated bilateral flexibility" prevail in Mexico? 
[de la Garza 1993, 1994]); 2) Mexico's democratic prospects; and 
3) the relationship between regime type and labor relations 
developments. Labor has played a key role in supporting Mexico's 
authoritarian regime and the hegemony of the PRI; a more 
democratic regime, in which presidential authority was more 
limited and in which the legislature took on greater political 
significance, might well signal the end of the "official" labor 
movement. Nonetheless, a more democratic and competitive 
regime could also conceivably revive the labor movement by 
incorporating it into decision making on national economic and 
social policy. This possibility is reinforced by moves in some 
Latin American countries to moderate elements of the classical 
array of neoliberal policies to address their high social and political 
costs. In this event, labor may be able to gain some of its former 
national political influence and authority under a different type of 
regime. On the other hand, a more democratic regime, faced with 
strong international and domestic (export-oriented) private sector 
pressures to maintain an open economy, could still rely on 
traditional methods of labor control, flexibility, and low wages in 
much of the manufacturing sector, while unionization rates 
continued to fall. This latter possibility would indicate that regime 
type is relatively unimportant in determining organized labor's 
prospects in the face of overwhelming economic pressures. 
At present, national political factors remain important 
determinants of trade union strategies in the Mexican case, in spite 
of (and perhaps because of) globalization and the restructuring of 
the economy. This preliminary examination of trade union 
220 
strategies in Mexico invites comparison with other Latin American 
cases, especially as they undergo similar economic experiences. 
For example, distinctive national political conditions in each 
country may indicate the existence of a variety of trade union 
responses to economic opening and restructuring. Or, on the 
contrary, a comparison of Latin American labor movements may 
show that national political conditions are less important in 
determining the strategic choices that unions adopt, and that 
similar economic conditions greatly narrow the range of trade 
unions' options throughout the region regardless of regime type or 
of labor's political orientation. A better understanding of the 
relative weight of economic, political, and organizational factors in 
shaping trade union strategies in each country will inform our 
sense of the strategic options available to labor movements in this 
hemisphere as they confront the new economic environment. 
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